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Abstract 
We consider the interaction of two countries regarding strategic choices on privatization policy in an international 
mixed market under an open economy. We demonstrate that the equilibrium degree of privatization depends not only 
on the relative efficiency of the state-owned enterprise, but also on trade policy. We show that the international 
competitive equilibrium involves less privatization and a higher tariff, even though they are jointly suboptimal. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, we have witnessed a widespread wave of privatization, which has had a remarkable 
impact on society. For example, based on the various empirical results, [1] Megginson and Netter (2001), 
[2] Megginson and Sutter (2006) and [10] Ethugala (2011) have reported that privatization generates 
positive effects in the society as well as at the privatized firms. [3] Barcena and Garzon(2005) and [4] 
Han and Ogawa(2008) considered a two-country model to incorporate the strategic interaction on 
privatization policy between two governments, and [5] Chang(2005), [6] Chao and Yu(2006), and [7] Yu 
and Lee(2011) constructed a mixed oligopoly model to examine the effect of trade policy on privatization 
policy. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the interaction of two governments regarding the strategic 
choice on privatization under trade policy. We show that the equilibrium degree of privatization depends 
not only on the relative efficiency between a state-owned enterprise and private firms, but also on the 
trade policy. In particular, we examine the relationship between optimal privatization and tariff policies in 
an international market and show that the competitive optimal degree of privatization in the local country 
is always lower than the global optimum, but the competitive optimal degree of tariff in the local country 
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is always higher than the global optimum. Therefore, the international competitive equilibrium involves 
less privatization and a higher tariff, even though they are jointly suboptimal.  
2. The Model and Analysis 
2.1 Open economy model: two country case with free trade 
 
Suppose that there are two countries: one is the home country (1) and the other is the foreign country 
(2). They produce homogeneous products and can trade those products. The home country and foreign 
country both have symmetric duopoly situations. We assume that the home state-owned enterprise(SOE) 
and private enterprise(PE) in each country can produce products, but PE only export them to the foreign 
country. Each country would impose a tax on the imports that are produced by the PE in the other country 
and investigate the interaction between privatization and tariff policies.  
The import tariff is defined by )0(tit  for country i. The inverse demand functions of both markets 
are the same and given by ,i iP QD   i =1, 2, where the price of market i is denoted by Pi and the output 
of market i is i si hi ejQ q q q    where 1,2i jz  .We assume that the cost function of the SOE is given 
as 
sisi kcqqC  )(  while that of the PE is )()( eihieihi qqcqqC   , i =1,2, where k > 1 and k is 
constant 
Suppose now 0 it ; the model then is reduced to a two country case of an open economy with free 
trade. Then, the profits of the SOEs and the PEs in the home country will be expressed as ʌsi, ʌpi, where 
sisiejhisisisiisi kcqqqqqkcqqP   )(DS
  
( ) (p i e i i j e ih i h i h iP q c q P q c qS S S       
The home country’s social welfare is defined as the sum of the consumer surplus in the home market 
and the home industry profit 
i si piiW CS SS   where 22
1 1 ( )
2 2i i si ejhi
CS Q q q q      
The firm’s behavior is constrained by its ownership structure. We suppose that the PE maximizes its 
profits, while the SOE maximizes the objective of the government, which is defined as social welfare. 
Following the partial privatization model of [8] Matsumura(1998) and [9] Lee and Hwang(2003), we also 
assume that the manager of the partially state-owned enterprise—a semi-SOE—maximizes the share-
weighted objectives between social welfare and profit. In the process of privatization, the government 
transforms the complete SOE into a semi-SOE, which is jointly owned by both the government and 
private investors. Then, decision-making behaviors of the SOE should take into account both the 
objectives of the government and the private sector. 
Let  refer to shares owned by private investors (or weights put on the profit). Then,  can be used 
to measure the degree of privatization; that is, the government owns a share of 1-  of the SOE. When 
0 T , this firm is a complete SOE, which maximizes social welfare, and when 1 T , it is a PE, which 
maximizes its profit. Therefore, SOE maximizes the share-weighted objectives between social welfare 
and profits, which are defined as Ti = (1-și)Wi +și ʌsi, where changes of  indicate the tendency of the 
SOE to seek social welfare or profits in the process of privatization. 
From the first-order conditions of the two SOEs and the two PEs in the two markets, we have the 
equilibrium outputs and market output and price: where i = 1, 2 
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Then, we get the social welfare function of country i:  
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Proposition 1: The global optimum, which maximizes global welfare, requires a higher degree of 
privatization than the local country optimum under open competition when the SOE is relatively 
inefficient. 
Proof: The differentiation of Wi with respect to și yields and the differentiation of W with respect to și 
yields: 
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Assuming interior solutions, we have the following socially optimal degree of privatization in an open 
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. Notice that the competitive 
optimal degree of privatization in an open economy is also increasing in k, i.e., io
k
=
( c)c
( 2kc+ c)2 > 0
.  
Assuming interior solutions, we have the following socially optimal degree of privatization in an open 
economy: * = 5(k 1)c
 6kc+5c
 when k <  +10c
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The intuition comes from the strategic interaction between the two independent countries. As shown in 
Proposition 1, there is a business stealing effect from the foreign firm under an open economy, and thus, 
concerning its own country’s welfare, each government will strategically reduce the degree of 
privatization to lessen the business-stealing effect. However, from the perspective of global welfare where 
both governments do not take the business-stealing effect into consideration at all, increasing the degree 
of privatization will increase the cost-saving effect from the PEs, and thus increase both the home 
country’s welfare and the other country’s welfare, i.e., global welfare. Notice that the global optimum in 
Proposition 3 is also increasing in k, but its increasing rate is faster than the local county optimum in 
Proposition 2, i.e., * / / 0oi ik kT Tw w ! w w ! .  
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We now consider the general case with a tariff policy. Then, profits of the PE in country i will be 
expressed as 
eijeieijhihiieihipi qtcqqPcqqP   )()(SSS . The home country’s social welfare Wi 
= CSi +ʌsi +ʌpi +tiqej. Again, the PE maximizes its profit, and the SOE maximizes the share-weighted 
objectives between social welfare and profits, Ti = (1-și)Wi +și ʌsi . 
From the first-order conditions of the two SOEs and the two PEs in the two markets, we have 
equilibrium outputs and market output and price are 
 qTsi =
2 3kc+ cti ( c2ti )i
2(1+i )
qThi =
( c)i + (k1)c+ ti
2(1+i )
 qTei =
( c2t j )j + (k 1)ct j
2(1+j )
. 
Qi
T =
2 kccti + ( c)i
2(1+i )
         Pi
T =
(k +1)c+ ti + ( +c)i
2(1+i )
.   
 
Proposition 2: Under an open economy with a tariff, the competitive equilibrium degree of 
privatization is partial privatization and is higher than without a tariff when the SOE is not very 
inefficient. 
 
Proof: The differentiation of Wi with respect to și and ti yields: 
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Assuming the interior (non-zero) solutions for equilibrium, we have the following equilibrium of 
privatization and tariff: ioT =
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2( 4kc+3c)
 and tioT =
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Q.e.d. 
The intuition is as follows. Compared to the free trade case, the government can use the tariff 
strategically to control the business-stealing effect from foreign countries. Furthermore, the home country 
has an additional income source from the tariff, which provides the home country with an incentive to 
increase the degree of privatization in order to increase revenue from the tariff.b Then, from the 
perspective of strategic interaction, given the other country’s lower privatization level and higher tariff 
level, it is beneficial for the home country to have less privatization and a higher tariff to reduce the 
business-stealing effect in its home country and raise tariff revenue. 
It is noteworthy that the globally optimal degree of privatization with a tariff is equal to that without a 
tariff since the global optimal tariff is zero, which means free trade yields global optimum. 
Proposition 3:  If each country sets the local country optimal tariff under an open economy, the 
equilibrium degree of privatization is lower than the degree of global optimal privatization without a tariff. 
 
Proof: The differentiations yields W
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= 0, we have the following global optimum for privatization: i*T =
5(k 1)c
 6kc+5c
 when k <  +10c
11c
and if 
k  +10c
11c
, i
*T =1 . Notice that the second-order condition satisfies the global optimum, i.e., 
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Notice that although the global optimum for privatization is increasing in k, its increasing rate is faster 
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This implies that even though both countries can get higher welfare from higher privatization and zero 
tariff policies, they would use a tariff instrument and less privatization to increase their own welfare in a 
competitive equilibrium. This competitive result can be seen as the prisoner’s dilemma in an international 
game situation: international competitive equilibrium involves less privatization and a higher tariff, even 
though they are jointly suboptimal. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
This paper introduced the competitive privatization and tariff policies in an international mixed market 
in which the SOE competes with the PE in both the home and foreign markets and investigated the 
interaction of the two governments regarding the strategic choice of privatization. We demonstrate that 
the equilibrium degree of privatization depends not only on the relative efficiency of the state-owned 
enterprise, but also on trade policy. We show that the international competitive equilibrium involves less 
privatization and a higher tariff, even though they are jointly suboptimal 
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